April 18, 2024

A curious case of a risk actor on the border between crimeware and cyberespionage

Asylum Ambuscade is a cybercrime group that has been performing cyberespionage operations on the aspect. They have been first publicly outed in March 2022 by Proofpoint researchers after the group focused European authorities employees concerned in serving to Ukrainian refugees, only a few weeks after the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine warfare. On this blogpost, we offer particulars concerning the early 2022 espionage marketing campaign and about a number of cybercrime campaigns in 2022 and 2023.

Key factors of this blogpost:

  • Asylum Ambuscade has been working since a minimum of 2020.
  • It’s a crimeware group that targets financial institution clients and cryptocurrency merchants in varied areas, together with North America and Europe.
  • Asylum Ambuscade additionally does espionage in opposition to authorities entities in Europe and Central Asia.
  • Many of the group’s implants are developed in script languages corresponding to AutoHotkey, JavaScript, Lua, Python, and VBS.

Cyberespionage campaigns

Asylum Ambuscade has been working cyberespionage campaigns since a minimum of 2020. We discovered earlier compromises of presidency officers and staff of state-owned corporations in Central Asia nations and Armenia.

In 2022, and as highlighted within the Proofpoint publication, the group focused authorities officers in a number of European nations bordering Ukraine. We assess that the objective of the attackers was to steal confidential data and webmail credentials from official authorities webmail portals.

The compromise chain begins with a spearphishing e-mail that has a malicious Excel spreadsheet attachment. Malicious VBA code therein downloads an MSI bundle from a distant server and installs SunSeed, a downloader written in Lua.

Notice that we noticed some variations within the attachments. In June 2022, the group used an exploit of the Follina vulnerability (CVE-2022-30190) as a substitute of malicious VBA code. This doc is proven in Determine 1. It’s written in Ukrainian and the decoy is a few safety alert concerning a Gamaredon (one other well-known espionage group) assault in Ukraine.

Determine 1. Doc leveraging the Follina vulnerability

Then, if the machine is deemed attention-grabbing, the attackers deploy the subsequent stage: AHKBOT. This can be a downloader written in AutoHotkey that may be prolonged with plugins, additionally written in AutoHotkey, in an effort to spy on the sufferer’s machine. An evaluation of the group’s toolset is supplied later within the blogpost.

Cybercrime campaigns

Despite the fact that the group got here into the highlight due to its cyberespionage operations, it has been largely working cybercrime campaigns since early 2020.

Since January 2022, we’ve got counted greater than 4,500 victims worldwide. Whereas most of them are situated in North America, as proven in Determine 2, it must be famous that we’ve got additionally seen victims in Asia, Africa, Europe, and South America.

Determine 2. Geographical distribution of victims since January 2022

The concentrating on could be very broad and largely contains people, cryptocurrency merchants, and small and medium companies (SMBs) in varied verticals.

Whereas the objective of concentrating on cryptocurrency merchants is sort of apparent – stealing cryptocurrency – we don’t know for positive how Asylum Ambuscade monetizes its entry to SMBs. It’s attainable the group sells the entry to different crimeware teams who would possibly, for instance, deploy ransomware. We’ve got not noticed this in our telemetry, although.

Asylum Ambuscade’s crimeware compromise chain is, general, similar to the one we describe for the cyberespionage campaigns. The primary distinction is the compromise vector, which may be:

  • A malicious Google Advert redirecting to an internet site delivering a malicious JavaScript file (as highlighted on this SANS blogpost)
  • A number of HTTP redirections in a Site visitors Route System (TDS). The TDS utilized by the group is known as 404 TDS by Proofpoint. It’s not unique to Asylum Ambuscade and we noticed it was, for instance, utilized by one other risk actor to ship Qbot. An instance of a redirection chain, captured by io, is proven in Determine 3.

Determine 3. 404 TDS redirection chain, as captured by urlscan.io – numbers point out the redirections in sequence

Along with the completely different compromise vector, the group developed SunSeed equivalents in different scripting languages corresponding to Tcl and VBS. In March 2023, it developed an AHKBOT equal in Node.js that we named NODEBOT. We imagine these adjustments have been meant to bypass detections from safety merchandise. An summary of the compromise chain is supplied in Determine 4.

Determine 4. Compromise chain

Attribution

We imagine that the cyberespionage and cybercrime campaigns are operated by the identical group.

  • The compromise chains are virtually equivalent in all campaigns. Particularly, SunSeed and AHKBOT have been extensively used for each cybercrime and cyberespionage.
  • We don’t imagine that SunSeed and AHKBOT are bought on the underground market. These instruments aren’t very subtle compared to different crimeware instruments on the market, the variety of victims is sort of low have been it a toolset shared amongst a number of teams, and the community infrastructure is constant throughout campaigns.

As such, we imagine that Asylum Ambuscade is a cybercrime group that’s doing a little cyberespionage on the aspect.

We additionally imagine that these three articles describe incidents associated to the group:

Toolset

Malicious JavaScript recordsdata

In most crimeware campaigns run by the group, the compromise vector is just not a malicious doc, however a JavaScript file downloaded from the beforehand documented TDS. Notice that it must be manually executed by the sufferer, so the attackers are attempting to entice folks into clicking on the recordsdata through the use of filenames corresponding to Document_12_dec-1532825.js, TeamViewer_Setup.js, or AnyDeskInstall.js.

These scripts are obfuscated utilizing random variable names and junk code, probably meant to bypass detections. An instance is supplied in Determine 5.

Determine 5. Obfuscated JavaScript downloader

As soon as deobfuscated, this script may be summarized in two traces:

First-stage downloaders

The primary stage downloaders are dropped by an MSI bundle downloaded by both a malicious doc or a JavaScript file. There are three variations of this downloader:

SunSeed is a downloader written within the Lua language and closely obfuscated, as proven in Determine 6.

Determine 6. The SunSeed Lua variant is closely obfuscated

As soon as manually deobfuscated, the principle perform of the script appears to be like like this:

 

It will get the serial variety of the C: drive and sends a GET request to http://<C&C>/<serial_number> utilizing the Consumer-Agent LuaSocket 2.0.2. It then tries to execute the reply. Because of this SunSeed expects to obtain further Lua scripts from the C&C server. We discovered two of these scripts: set up and transfer.

set up is a straightforward Lua script that downloads an AutoHotkey script into C:ProgramDatamscoree.ahk and the official AutoHotkey interpreter into C:ProgramDatamscoree.exe, as proven in Determine 7. This AutoHotkey script is AHKBOT, the second stage downloader.

Determine 7. Lua script that downloads an AutoHotkey script

An excellent less complicated Lua script, transfer, is proven in Determine 8. It’s used to reassign administration of a victimized pc from one C&C server to a different. It’s not attainable to replace the hardcoded SunSeed C&C server; to finish a C&C reassignment, a brand new MSI installer must be downloaded and executed, precisely as when the machine was first compromised.

Determine 8. Lua script to maneuver administration of a compromised machine from one C&C server to a different

As talked about above, we discovered one other variant of SunSeed developed utilizing the Tcl language as a substitute of Lua, as proven in Determine 9. The primary distinction is that it doesn’t ship the C: drive’s serial quantity within the GET request.

Determine 9. SunSeed variant in Tcl

The third variant was developed in VBS, as proven in Determine 10. The primary distinction is that it doesn’t obtain and interpret further code, however downloads and executes an MSI bundle.

Determine 10. SunSeed variant in VBS

Second-stage downloaders

The primary second-stage downloader is AHKBOT, developed in AutoHotkey. As proven in Determine 11, it sends a GET request, with the Consumer-Agent AutoHotkey (the default worth utilized by AutoHotkey), to http://<C&C>/<serial_number_of_C_drive>-RP, virtually precisely as the sooner SunSeed. RP is perhaps a marketing campaign identifier, because it adjustments from pattern to pattern.

Determine 11. AHKBOT

AHKBOT may be discovered on disk at varied places, corresponding to C:ProgramDatamscoree.ahk or C:ProgramDataadb.ahk. It downloads and interprets spy plugins, additionally developed in AutoHotkey. A abstract of the 21 plugins is supplied in Desk 1.

Desk 1. SunSeed plugins

Plugin title Description
ass Obtain and execute a Cobalt Strike loader filled with VMProtect. The beacon’s configuration extracted utilizing the software CobaltStrikeParser is supplied within the IoCs within the Cobalt Strike configuration part.
join Ship the log message related! to the C&C server.
deletecookies Obtain SQLite from /obtain?path=sqlite3slashsqlite3dotdll through HTTP from its C&C server, then delete browser cookies for the domains td.com (a Canadian financial institution) and mail.ru. We don’t know why the attackers have to delete cookies, particularly for these domains. It’s attainable it’s meant to delete session cookies to power its victims to reenter their credentials that may then be captured by the keylogger.
deskscreen Take a screenshot utilizing Gdip.BitmapFromScreen and ship it to the C&C server.
deskscreenon Much like deskscreen however take screenshots in a 15-second loop.
deskscreenoff Cease the deskscreenon loop.
area Collect details about the Energetic Listing utilizing the next instructions:
· cmd /c chcp 65001 && internet group “area admins” /area
· cmd /c chcp 65001 && internet group “enterprise admins” /area
· cmd /c chcp 65001 && internet group “”Area Computer systems”” /area
· cmd /c chcp 65001 && nltest /dclist:
· cmd /c chcp 65001 && nltest /DOMAIN_TRUSTS
· cmd /c chcp 65001 && ipconfig /all
· cmd /c chcp 65001 && systeminfo
{hardware} Get sufferer’s host data utilizing WMI queries:
· Choose * from Win32_OperatingSystem
· SELECT * FROM Win32_LogicalDisk
· SELECT * FROM Win32_Processor
· Choose * from Win32_OperatingSystem
· SELECT * FROM Win32_VideoController
· Choose * from Win32_NetworkAdapterConfiguration WHERE IPEnabled = True
· Choose * from FirewallProduct
· Choose * from AntiSpywareProduct
· Choose * from AntiVirusProduct
· SELECT * FROM Win32_Product
· SELECT Caption,ExecutablePath,ProcessID FROM Win32_Process the place ExecutablePath is just not null

and ship to the C&C server.
hvncon Obtain and execute a customized hVNC (hidden VNC) software from
http://<C&C>/obtain?path=hvncslashhvncdotzip
hvncoff Cease the hVNC by executing taskkill /f /im hvnc.exe.
installchrome Obtain http:///obtain?path=chromeslashchromedotzip, a official copy of Google Chrome, and unpack it into %LocalAppDatapercentGoogle‌ChromeApplication. This copy of Chrome is probably going utilized by hVNC if the sufferer doesn’t have Chrome put in.
keylogon Begin the keylogger, hooked enter utilizing DllCall(“SetWindowsHookEx”, […]). The keystrokes are despatched to the C&C server when the lively software adjustments.
keylogoff Cease the keylogger.
passwords Steal passwords from Web Explorer, Firefox, and Chromium-based browsers. It downloads SQLite to learn the browser storages. It may well additionally decrypt regionally encrypted passwords by calling the Microsoft CryptUnprotectData perform. Stolen passwords are despatched to the C&C server.

This plugin appears to be like similar to the password stealer described by Development Micro in 2020, together with the exhausting drive serial numbers used for debugging: 605109072 and 2786990575. This might point out that it’s nonetheless being developed on the identical machines.

rutservon Obtain a distant entry trojan (RAT) from http://<C&C>/‌obtain?path=rutservslashagent6dot10dotexe (SHA-1: 3AA8A4554B175DB9DA5EEB7824B5C047638A6A9D).
This can be a business RAT developed by Remote Utilities LLC that gives full management over the machine on which it’s put in.
rutservoff Kill the RAT.
steal Obtain and execute an infostealer – in all probability based mostly on Rhadamanthys.
tasklist Listing working processes through the use of the WMI question Choose * from Win32_Process.
towake Transfer the mouse utilizing MouseMove, 100, 100. That is more likely to forestall the pc from going to sleep, particularly given the title of the plugin.
replace Obtain a brand new model of SunSeed AutoHotkey from the C&C server and substitute the present SunSeed on disk. The AutoHotkey interpreter is situated in C:ProgramDataadb.exe.
wndlist Listing lively home windows by calling WinGet home windows, Listing (Autohotkey syntax).

The plugins ship the outcome again to the C&C server utilizing a log perform, as proven in Determine 12.

Determine 12. Log perform

In March 2023, the attackers developed a variant of AHKBOT in Node.js that we’ve got named NODEBOT – see Determine 13.

Determine 13. NODEBOT

The attackers additionally rewrote some AHKBOT plugins in JavaScript to make them suitable with NODEBOT. To this point, we’ve got noticed the next plugins (an asterisk signifies that the plugin is new to NODEBOT):

  • join
  • deskscreen
  • {hardware}
  • hcmdon (a reverse shell in Node.js)*
  • hvncoff
  • hvncon
  • keylogoff
  • keylogon (obtain and execute the AutoHotkey keylogger)
  • mods (obtain and set up hVNC)*
  • passwords
  • display screen

Conclusion

Asylum Ambuscade is a cybercrime group largely concentrating on SMBs and people in North America and Europe. Nevertheless, it seems to be branching out, working some latest cyberespionage campaigns on the aspect, in opposition to governments in Central Asia and Europe on occasion.

It’s fairly uncommon to catch a cybercrime group working devoted cyberespionage operations, and as such we imagine that researchers ought to hold shut observe of Asylum Ambuscade actions.

ESET Analysis gives personal APT intelligence stories and information feeds. For any inquiries about this service, go to the ESET Threat Intelligence web page.

IoCs

Information

SHA-1 Filename ESET detection title Description
2B42FD41A1C8AC12221857DD2DF93164A71B95D7 ass.dll Win64/Packed.VMProtect.OX Cobalt Strike loader.
D5F8ACAD643EE8E1D33D184DAEA0C8EA8E7FD6F8 M_suri antiinfla_ioniste Polonia.doc DOC/TrojanDownloader.Agent.AAP Doc exploiting the Follina vulnerability.
57157C5D3C1BB3EB3E86B24B1F4240C867A5E94F N/A Win32/TrojanDownloader.AutoHK.KH AHKBOT.
7DB446B95D5198330B2B25E4BA6429C57942CFC9 N/A VBS/Agent.QOF Python screenshotter.
5F67279C195F5E8A35A24CBEA76E25BAD6AB6E8E N/A VBS/TrojanDownloader.Agent.YDQ VBS downloader.
C98061592DE61E34DA280AB179465580947890DE set up.msi JS/Agent.QRI NODEBOT.
519E388182DE055902C656B2D95CCF265A96CEAB Document_12_dec-1532825.js JS/TrojanDownloader.Agent.ZJM Malicious JavaScript file distributed through the TDS.
AC3AFD14AD1AEA9E77A84C84022B4022DF1FC88B ahk Win32/Spy.AHK.AD AHKBOT plugin.
64F5AC9F0C6C12F2A48A1CB941847B0662734FBF ass Win32/TrojanDownloader.AHK.N AHKBOT plugin.
557C5150A44F607EC4E7F4D0C0ED8EE6E9D12ADF join Win32/Spy.AHK.AD AHKBOT plugin.
F85B82805C6204F34DB0858E2F04DA9F620A0277 deletecookies Win32/Spy.AHK.AD AHKBOT plugin.
5492061DE582E71B2A5DA046536D4150F6F497F1 deskscreen Win32/Spy.AHK.AD AHKBOT plugin.
C554100C15ED3617EBFAAB00C983CED5FEC5DB11 deskscreenoff Win32/Spy.AHK.AD AHKBOT plugin.
AD8143DE4FC609608D8925478FD8EA3CD9A37C5D deskscreenon Win32/Spy.AHK.AD AHKBOT plugin.
F2948C27F044FC6FB4849332657801F78C0F7D5E area Win32/TrojanDownloader.AutoHK.KH AHKBOT plugin.
7AA23E871E796F89C465537E6ECE962412CDA636 {hardware} Win32/Spy.AHK.AD AHKBOT plugin.
384961E19624437EB4EB22B1BF45953D7147FB8F hvncoff Win32/Spy.AHK.AD AHKBOT plugin.
7FDB9A73B3F13DBD94D392132D896A5328DACA59 hvncon Win32/Spy.AHK.AD AHKBOT plugin.
3E38D54CC55A48A3377A7E6A0800B09F2E281978 installchrome Win32/Spy.AHK.AD AHKBOT plugin.
7F8742778FC848A6FBCFFEC9011B477402544171 keylogoff Win32/Spy.AHK.AD AHKBOT plugin.
29604997030752919EA42B6D6CEE8D3AE28F527E keylogon Win32/Spy.AHK.AD AHKBOT plugin.
7A78AF75841C2A8D8A5929C214F08EB92739E9CB passwords Win32/Spy.AHK.AB AHKBOT plugin.
441369397D0F8DB755282739A05CB4CF52113C40 rutservoff Win32/Spy.AHK.AD AHKBOT plugin.
117ECFA95BE19D5CF135A27AED786C98EC8CE50B rutservon Win32/Spy.AHK.AD AHKBOT plugin.
D24A9C8A57C08D668F7D4A5B96FB7B5BA89D74C3 steal Win32/Spy.AHK.AE AHKBOT plugin.
95EDC096000C5B8DA7C8F93867F736928EA32575 towake Win32/Spy.AHK.AD AHKBOT plugin.
62FA77DAEF21772D599F2DC17DBBA0906B51F2D9 replace Win32/Spy.AHK.AD AHKBOT plugin.
A9E3ACFE029E3A80372C0BB6B7C500531D09EDBE wndlist Win32/Spy.AHK.AD AHKBOT plugin.
EE1CFEDD75CBA9028904C759740725E855AA46B5 tasklist Win32/Spy.AHK.AD AHKBOT plugin.

Community

IP Area Internet hosting supplier First seen Particulars
5.39.222[.]150 N/A Hostkey_NL abuse, ORG-HB14-RIPE February 27, 2022 C&C server.
5.44.42[.]27 snowzet[.]com GLOBAL INTERNET SOLUTIONS LLC December 7, 2022 Cobalt Strike C&C server.
5.230.68[.]137 N/A GHOSTnet GmbH September 5, 2022 C&C server.
5.230.71[.]166 N/A GHOSTnet GmbH August 17, 2022 C&C server.
5.230.72[.]38 N/A GHOSTnet GmbH September 24, 2022 C&C server.
5.230.72[.]148 N/A GHOSTnet GmbH September 26, 2022 C&C server.
5.230.73[.]57 N/A GHOSTnet GmbH August 9, 2022 C&C server.
5.230.73[.]63 N/A GHOSTnet GmbH June 2, 2022 C&C server.
5.230.73[.]241 N/A GHOSTnet GmbH August 20, 2022 C&C server.
5.230.73[.]247 N/A GHOSTnet GmbH August 9, 2022 C&C server.
5.230.73[.]248 N/A GHOSTnet GmbH June 1, 2022 C&C server.
5.230.73[.]250 N/A GHOSTnet GmbH June 2, 2022 C&C server.
5.252.118[.]132 N/A aezagroup March 1, 2023 C&C server.
5.252.118[.]204 N/A aezagroup March 1, 2023 C&C server.
5.255.88[.]222 N/A Serverius Might 28, 2022 C&C server.
23.106.123[.]119 N/A IRT-LSW-SG February 4, 2022 C&C server.
31.192.105[.]28 N/A HOSTKEY B.V. February 23, 2022 C&C server.
45.76.211[.]131 N/A The Fixed Firm, LLC January 19, 2023 C&C server.
45.77.185[.]151 N/A Vultr Holdings, LLC December 16, 2022 C&C server.
45.132.1[.]238 N/A Miglovets Egor Andreevich November 7, 2022 C&C server.
45.147.229[.]20 N/A COMBAHTON January 22, 2022 C&C server.
46.17.98[.]190 N/A Hostkey_NL abuse, ORG-HB14-RIPE August 31, 2020 C&C server.
46.151.24[.]197 N/A Internet hosting expertise LTD January 1, 2023 C&C server.
46.151.24[.]226 N/A Internet hosting expertise LTD December 23, 2022 C&C server.
46.151.25[.]15 N/A Internet hosting expertise LTD December 27, 2022 C&C server.
46.151.25[.]49 N/A Podolsk Electrosvyaz Ltd. December 29, 2022 C&C server.
46.151.28[.]18 N/A Internet hosting expertise LTD January 1, 2023 C&C server.
51.83.182[.]153 N/A OVH March 8, 2022 C&C server.
51.83.189[.]185 N/A OVH March 5, 2022 C&C server.
62.84.99[.]195 N/A VDSINA-NL March 27, 2023 C&C server.
62.204.41[.]171 N/A HORIZONMSK-AS December 12, 2022 C&C server.
77.83.197[.]138 N/A HZ-UK-AS March 7, 2022 C&C server.
79.137.196[.]121 N/A AEZA GROUP Ltd March 1, 2023 C&C server.
79.137.197[.]187 N/A aezagroup December 1, 2022 C&C server.
80.66.88[.]155 N/A XHOST INTERNET SOLUTIONS LP February 24, 2022 C&C server.
84.32.188[.]29 N/A UAB Cherry Servers January 10, 2022 C&C server.
84.32.188[.]96 N/A UAB Cherry Servers January 29, 2022 C&C server.
85.192.49[.]106 N/A Internet hosting expertise LTD December 25, 2022 C&C server.
85.192.63[.]13 N/A AEZA GROUP Ltd December 27, 2022 C&C server.
85.192.63[.]126 N/A aezagroup March 5, 2023 C&C server.
85.239.60[.]40 N/A Clouvider April 30, 2022 C&C server.
88.210.10[.]62 N/A Internet hosting expertise LTD December 12, 2022 C&C server.
89.41.182[.]94 N/A Abuse-C Position, ORG-HS136-RIPE September 3, 2021 C&C server.
89.107.10[.]7 N/A Miglovets Egor Andreevich December 4, 2022 C&C server.
89.208.105[.]255 N/A AEZA GROUP Ltd December 22, 2022 C&C server.
91.245.253[.]112 N/A M247 Europe March 4, 2022 C&C server.
94.103.83[.]46 N/A Internet hosting expertise LTD December 11, 2022 C&C server.
94.140.114[.]133 N/A NANO-AS March 8, 2022 C&C server.
94.140.114[.]230 N/A NANO-AS April 13, 2022 C&C server.
94.140.115[.]44 N/A NANO-AS April 1, 2022 C&C server.
94.232.41[.]96 N/A XHOST INTERNET SOLUTIONS LP October 2, 2022 C&C server.
94.232.41[.]108 N/A XHOST INTERNET SOLUTIONS LP August 19, 2022 C&C server.
94.232.43[.]214 N/A XHOST-INTERNET-SOLUTIONS October 10, 2022 C&C server.
98.142.251[.]26 N/A BlueVPS OU April 29, 2022 C&C server.
98.142.251[.]226 N/A BlueVPS OU April 12, 2022 C&C server.
104.234.118[.]163 N/A IPXO LLC March 1, 2023 C&C server.
104.248.149[.]122 N/A DigitalOcean, LLC December 11, 2022 C&C server.
109.107.173[.]72 N/A Internet hosting expertise LTD January 20, 2023 C&C server.
116.203.252[.]67 N/A Hetzner On-line GmbH – Contact Position, ORG-HOA1-RIPE March 5, 2022 C&C server.
128.199.82[.]141 N/A Digital Ocean December 11, 2022 C&C server.
139.162.116[.]148 N/A Akamai Related Cloud March 3, 2022 C&C server.
141.105.64[.]121 N/A HOSTKEY B.V. March 21, 2022 C&C server.
146.0.77[.]15 N/A Hostkey_NL April 10, 2022 C&C server.
146.70.79[.]117 N/A M247 Ltd March 2, 2022 C&C server.
157.254.194[.]225 N/A Tier.Internet Applied sciences LLC March 1, 2023 C&C server.
157.254.194[.]238 N/A Tier.Internet Applied sciences LLC March 13, 2023 C&C server.
172.64.80[.]1 namesilo.my[.]id Cloudflare, Inc. December 14, 2022 C&C server.
172.86.75[.]49 N/A BL Networks Might 17, 2021 C&C server.
172.104.94[.]104 N/A Linode March 5, 2022 C&C server.
172.105.235[.]94 N/A Linode April 5, 2022 C&C server.
172.105.253[.]139 N/A Akamai Related Cloud March 3, 2022 C&C server.
176.124.214[.]229 N/A VDSINA-NL December 26, 2022 C&C server.
176.124.217[.]20 N/A Internet hosting expertise LTD March 2, 2023 C&C server.
185.70.184[.]44 N/A Hostkey_NL April 12, 2021 C&C server.
185.82.126[.]133 N/A Sia Nano IT March 12, 2022 C&C server.
185.123.53[.]49 N/A BV-EU-AS March 14, 2022 C&C server.
185.150.117[.]122 N/A UAB Cherry Servers April 2, 2021 C&C server.
185.163.45[.]221 N/A MivoCloud SRL January 2, 2023 C&C server.
193.109.69[.]52 N/A Hostkey_NL November 5, 2021 C&C server.
193.142.59[.]152 N/A HostShield LTD Admin November 17, 2022 C&C server.
193.142.59[.]169 N/A ColocationX Ltd. November 8, 2022 C&C server.
194.180.174[.]51 N/A MivoCloud SRL December 24, 2022 C&C server.
195.2.81[.]70 N/A Internet hosting expertise LTD September 27, 2022 C&C server.
195.133.196[.]230 N/A JSC Mediasoft ekspert July 15, 2022 C&C server.
212.113.106[.]27 N/A AEZA GROUP Ltd January 28, 2023 C&C server.
212.113.116[.]147 N/A JY Cell Communications March 1, 2023 C&C server.
212.118.43[.]231 N/A Internet hosting expertise LTD March 1, 2023 C&C server.
213.109.192[.]230 N/A BV-EU-AS June 1, 2022 C&C server.

Cobalt Strike configuration

MITRE ATT&CK methods

This desk was constructed utilizing version 13 of the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

Tactic ID Identify Description
Useful resource Growth T1583.003 Purchase Infrastructure: Digital Non-public Server Asylum Ambuscade rented VPS servers.
T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware Asylum Ambuscade develops customized implants in varied scripting languages.
Preliminary Entry T1189 Drive-by Compromise Targets have been redirected through a TDS to an internet site delivering a malicious JavaScript file.
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment Targets obtain malicious Excel or Phrase paperwork.
Execution T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visible Primary Asylum Ambuscade has a downloader in VBS.
T1059.006 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python Asylum Ambuscade has a screenshotter in Python.
T1059.007 Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript Asylum Ambuscade has a downloader in JavaScript (NODEBOT).
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Asylum Ambuscade has downloaders in different scripting languages corresponding to Lua, AutoHotkey, or Tcl.
T1204.002 Consumer Execution: Malicious File Targets must manually execute the malicious doc or JavaScript file.
Persistence T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder SunSeed persists through a LNK file within the startup folder.
Protection Evasion T1027.010 Obfuscated Information or Data: Command Obfuscation Downloaded JavaScript recordsdata are obfuscated with junk code.
Credential Entry T1555.003 Credentials from Password Shops: Credentials from Internet Browsers AHKBOT passwords plugin can steal browser credentials.
Discovery T1087.002 Account Discovery: Area Account AHKBOT area plugin gathers details about the area utilizing internet group.
T1010 Software Window Discovery AHKBOT wndlist plugin lists the lively home windows.
T1482 Area Belief Discovery AHKBOT area plugin gathers data utilizing nltest.
T1057 Course of Discovery AHKBOT tasklist plugin lists the lively processes utilizing Choose * from Win32_Process.
T1518.001 Software program Discovery: Safety Software program Discovery AHKBOT {hardware} plugin lists safety software program utilizing Choose * from FirewallProduct, Choose * from AntiSpywareProduct and Choose * from AntiVirusProduct.
T1082 System Data Discovery AHKBOT wndlist plugin will get system data utilizing systeminfo.
T1016 System Community Configuration Discovery AHKBOT wndlist plugin will get community configuration data utilizing ipconfig /all.
Assortment T1056.001 Enter Seize: Keylogging AHKBOT keylogon information keystrokes.
T1115 Clipboard Information AHKBOT keylogon screens the clipboard.
T1113 Display Seize AHKBOT deskscreen takes screenshot.
Command and Management T1071.001 Software Layer Protocol: Internet Protocols AHKBOT (and all the opposite downloaders) communicates with the C&C server through HTTP.
Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Information is exfiltrated through the C&C channel.